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This article traces the development of German politics of deporting Afghans. Since the great 
inﬂux of refugees in 2015 – which doubled the number of Afghans in Germany – the asylum 
acceptance rate of Afghan refugees has been reduced while at the same time the government has 
made efforts to increase the number of deportations, arguing that parts of Afghanistan are 
“safe” for deportees, in spite of increasing violence in the country. Using a logic of deserving-
ness, politicians maintain that the only persons deported are those who refuse to “integrate”. In 
fact, however, more “well-integrated” Afghans are deported than persons with a criminal rec-
ord. Within the context of an increasingly restrictive asylum system, the emphasis on deporta-
tions has to be understood as an attempt to counter the rise of right-wing populism in Germa-
ny. Yet activists who support individual refugees and rejected asylum seekers, trying to prevent 
their deportation, increasingly contest this approach. By pointing out that particular persons 
who are threatened by deportation are “well integrated” and therefore deserve to stay, these 
activists essentially accept and reinforce the logic of deservingness. The article argues that the 
deportee epitomises the current reterritorialisation of nation-states and global system of un-
equal (im)mobility.
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Introduction 
At the beginning of the 1990s a new paradigm began to dominate migration 
studies: transnationalism. Migration could no longer be conceptualised exclu-
sively as a unidirectional movement governed by push and pull factors. The 
ﬁgure of the transmigrant entered academic discourse: someone who moves 
back and forth between different national spaces and is almost equally inte-
grated in two or more national societies. These were the heady days of neo-li-
beral globalisation euphoria after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when time and 
space appeared to become increasingly compressed and the world shrank 
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into a global village inhabited by cosmopolitan citizens. Almost without hin-
drances, goods, capital, ideas and to a lesser extent also people seemed to 
cross national boundaries, which in any case were soon expected to lose all 
signiﬁcance. Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller and Cristina Szanton Blanc, 
who were among the leading protagonists developing the transnationalism 
paradigm, published, along with many articles, a book with the programmat-
ic title Nations Unbound. While the authors certainly did not argue that na-
tional borders had lost their signiﬁcance, they emphasised transmigration and 
the deterritorialisation of the nation-state. 
Thirty years on the world has changed dramatically. Globalisation eupho-
ria is certainly a thing of the past. While capital still ﬂows around the globe 
with great ease, many people increasingly view these ﬂows as pernicious. And 
although many people are on the move – perhaps more than ever – all manner 
of attempts are made to limit and direct their ﬂow. States erect walls and fenc-
es at their borders and tighten border controls to prevent immigration. 
Through increasingly ingenious instruments and techniques of surveillance, 
bordering is no longer simply a matter of the external margins of states and 
nations. “Everyday bordering” can occur anywhere within a national space 
(Yuval-Davis et al. 2017, Strasser / Tibet 2019). An (almost) global wave of 
populism (Brubaker 2017) redeﬁnes societies in essentialist and reterritorialis-
ing terms, vowing to stop immigration and to exclude and even to expel peo-
ple regarded as aliens. Those who are granted the right stay have to earn their 
“deservingness” by submitting themselves to a regime of “integration”. Con-
comitantly, border studies have gained substantial prominence in academia. 
Nations have been “re-bound”; states are reterritorialised. Accordingly, 
transnationalism studies also increasingly reemphasise the state and state 
practices of bordering (Glick Schiller 2007: 456f). Today, somewhat symboli-
cally, the epitomising ﬁgure of migration is no longer the “transmigrant” but 
the “deportee” – the deportee whose removal is required in order to maintain 
the sovereign order of the territorial nation-state. 
Although four years have passed since the “summer of migration” (Hess et 
al. 2017) the “refugee issue” continues to dominate political debates in Ger-
many to a large extent, also because new right-wing parties and organisations 
have entered the scene. Discourse about refugees is increasingly dominated by 
the question of deportation. Compared to the number of new arrivals, the 
number of actual, “successful” deportations is quite low: in 2018, around 
57,000 persons were scheduled for deportation from Germany, but in almost 
31,000 cases the deportation could not be carried out, for various reasons 
(Spiegel 2019). But the government is attempting to increase the number of 
deportations. At the time of writing in spring 2019, the Ministry of Interior 
was drafting a “Law of Orderly Return” (Geordnete Rückkehrgesetz) that not 
only intends to further limit the rights of migrants without a secure right of 
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residency, but also to criminalise activists who support rejected asylum-seek-
ers bound for deportation. According to the ﬁrst draft of the law, activists and 
civil society organisations that leak the news of imminent deportation to mi-
grants will be held accountable and may be sentenced to up to three years in 
prison.1 This provision reveals a fundamental conﬂict between government 
institutions and anti-deportation activists over the issue. In May 2018 Alexan-
der Dobrindt, the leader of the Christian Social Union faction in the German 
Parliament (CSU, the conservative regional party of Bavaria), coined the con-
temptuous term “anti-deportation industries” (Anti-Abschiebe-Industrie) to 
refer to lawyers and activists who attempt to prevent deportations (Süd-
deutsche Zeitung 2018a). From the perspective of the government and its sup-
porters, deportation has become a signiﬁcant issue where both the territorial 
sovereignty of the state and the rule of law need to be maintained. Yet in early 
2019, a commission of linguists selected the term as the “non-word of the year 
2018” (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2019a), again revealing fundamental disagree-
ment over deportation policies. Deportations to Afghanistan, in particular, 
have become highly controversial. While the government reiterates that parts 
of Afghanistan are safe enough for deportees – in spite of the fact that two 
years after the bombing of the German embassy in Kabul, Germany still does 
not have a fully operating diplomatic representation in the country – refugee 
support activists emphasise that nowhere in Afghanistan is safe, particularly 
for deportees from Europe. 
In this article, I will ﬁrst brieﬂy survey current research on deportation in 
the social sciences before turning to recent shifts in German policies of depor-
tation in general and to the deportation of Afghans in particular, which is also 
intended to counter anti-refugee right-wing populism. Finally, I will analyse 
activism for the prevention of the deportation of Afghans in Bavaria, arguing 
that this activism often affirms the dominant logics of integration and deserv-
ingness, thus resorting to what I call strategic integrationism. 
Deportation studies
The study of borders and border regimes has emphasised that globalisation 
has by no means dissolved national boundaries and enabled general mobility. 
On the contrary, borders have been tightened to serve the channelling func-
tion of granting passage to some while stopping others (De Genova / Peutz 
1 In its ﬁnal version, the law deﬁnes dates of deportations as state secrets, the disclosure of which is a 
criminal offence. While this provision is aimed primarily at officials, also activists that instigate the disclo-
sure of such information are criminalised. Dunja Mijatović, Human Rights Commissioner of the Council of 
Europe, strongly criticised this provision (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2019b). For a critical assessment of the law 
see also Hruschka 2019.
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2010, Tsianos / Karakayali 2010, Fassin 2011). Further, borders not only 
mark the margins of states but increasingly structure societies and their prac-
tices as a whole (Yuval-Davis et al. 2017). Thus, the “mobility paradigm” 
(Sheller / Urry 2006, Urry 2007) requires a decisive qualiﬁcation exempliﬁed 
by the ﬁgure of the refugee: borderless mobility does not apply to everyone; 
refugees’ crossing of borders is unwelcome and “illegal” and they are subjected 
to detailed determinations of whether or not they deserve admission (Holmes / 
Castañeda 2016, Yarris / Castañeda 2015, Chauvin / Garcés-Mascareñas 2014). 
During these determinations and afterwards, refugees are often immobilised 
in camps and conﬁned before being physically deported. While the neoliberal 
regime produces those global inequalities that increasingly compel people to 
resort to strategies of refugee-migration in order to gain security, including 
the chance to secure a livelihood, the states of the north increasingly adopt 
programmes of remigration or deportation to reduce the number of migrants 
and to serve as a deterrence. Research has shown, however, that this deter-
rence rarely works: for many migrants, deportation or remigration is merely 
the beginning of the next cycle of migration (Khosravi 2016, Schuster / Majidi 
2013). 
Ultimately, deportation and remigration serve the purpose of maintaining 
north-south inequality (and inequity) through the establishment of a pervasive 
and strictly selective border regime.2 Deportation prevents the labour of the 
global south from taking part in the wealth of the north and maintains a sta-
ble pay gap between North and South (Khosravi 2017, Golash-Boza 2015). 
The exclusion of “economic refugees” is crucial for upholding the distinction 
between “desired/legal” and “undesired/illegal” migrants, between “good” 
and “bad” refugees, between those who “deserve” protection and those who 
are considered undeserving because they have escaped only from unfavour-
able economic conditions. Deservingness is the central category of this distinc-
tion3 and also plays a central role in the German government’s decisions about 
deportations to Afghanistan, as I will show below. 
Research on deportation and (more or less voluntary) remigration has be-
come an important part of the study of migration and (im)mobility. It shows 
that deportation and remigration take place within a complex ﬁeld of practic-
es, structures, expectations and power relations in local, national and transna-
tional contexts. A neat analytical distinction between “refugees” and “mi-
grants” is as impossible as is the distinction between deportation and 
remigration – unless one uncritically accepts the premises of the asylum sys-
tem that stipulates that only “genuine refugees” deserve protection and ac-
2 See Collyer 2017, Khosravi 2017a, De Genova 2016, Drotbohm / Hasselberg 2015: 552ff, Golash-Boza 
2015, Casas-Cortes et al. 2014, Fassin 2011, De Genova / Peutz 2010, Hess / Kasparek 2010, Shamir 2005.
3 See Holmes / Castañeda 2016, Yarris / Castañeda 2015, Chauvin / Garcés-Mascareñas 2014, Coutin 
2000: 11.
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commodation.4 “Voluntary” remigration may just be a desperate strategy to 
escape deportation, as deportations come with high costs for the deportees. 
Not only is the deportation often a traumatising experience itself, but depor-
tees are banned from re-entering Germany and the Schengen area for at least 
ﬁve years and they have to pay the expenses of their deportation before being 
able to apply for a visa to Germany. Migrants who re-enter Germany “illegal-
ly” after having been deported may be sentenced to up to three years in prison. 
Peutz (2006) calls for an anthropology of removal that examines the depor-
tation regime. The danger of deportation looms over migrants in all stages of 
migration, during which they run the danger of being detained and ultimately 
removed. This is often a condition of extended periods of waiting and insecu-
rity (Griffiths 2014, Lakha 2009), not necessarily governed by comprehensible 
rules, that establishes the migrant’s state of “deportability” (De Genova 2016). 
This article contributes to the anthropology of removal by taking up the spe-
ciﬁc case of deportations from Germany to Afghanistan. To provide some con-
text, however, a more general look at asylum and deportation politics and 
policies in Germany is required ﬁrst. 
Recent politics of deportation in Germany
Deportations have often been controversial, especially in Germany after the 
ruthless deportation regime of the Nazi government. While historically depor-
tation was an instrument for the expulsion of foreign criminals and a means 
to prevent aliens from disturbing the public order (Paoletti 2010: 8), in recent 
decades it has become an instrument for the control and “management” of 
migration and is considered necessary and legitimate by governments (Schus-
ter 2005). Paoletti thus speaks of a “deportation turn” in which “deportation 
has emerged as a form of state practice distinct from other forms of expulsion 
as a way to deal with failed asylum seekers as well as foreigners convicted of 
crimes” (Paoletti 2010: 8). “Deportation today is not an exception, but rather 
a normalised and distinct form of state power,” writes Ines Hasselberg (2016: 
1). The ability to allow or deny non-citizens the right to stay in a country is 
seen as a fundamental aspect of state sovereignty. Yet because only those who 
refuse to leave a country “voluntarily” are deported, deportation is always an 
act of force that violates the autonomy of a person. For many migrants who 
lack the secure right to stay, deportation is a continuous existential threat. In 
order to cover up this violence to some extent, governments and bureaucrats 
often use “softer” terms. In Germany, for instance, politicians increasingly 
4 For a critical review of the debate about the refugee-migrant dichotomy see Crawley / Skleparis 2018.
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use the term Rückführung (“repatriation”) instead of Abschiebung (“deporta-
tion”). 
The 1990s were the decade of the deportation turn in Germany. With the 
cold war ending, the situation of asylum changed fundamentally: what had 
before mainly been an opportunity for dissidents from the socialist states now 
became largely an avenue of migration for people from the global south. As 
the grievances of many refugees coming to Germany did not ﬁt the legal deﬁ-
nition of asylum or their experiences of persecution and threats were doubted, 
few of them were granted asylum. Since the late 1980s, the ﬁgure of the 
Wirtschaftsflüchtling (“economic refugee”) and the Scheinasylant (“bogus 
refugee”) who purportedly misused the asylum system rose to prominence in 
German political discourse. Governmental policies of asylum became almost 
exclusively geared at reducing the numbers of claims and grants of asylum. In 
principle, all those who were not granted asylum had to leave the country and 
were potential deportees. 
The politics of asylum (and of migration in general) has always been highly 
contentious in Germany. Right wing mobilisation has been a standard result 
of growing numbers of refugees and immigrants. The early 1990s were noto-
rious for racist attacks on immigrants in Germany, some of them with deadly 
results, as well as for electoral gains of extreme right parties.5 The government 
tried to pre-empt such reactions by introducing limitations to the right of asy-
lum (Ellermann 2009: 54f). Thus, among other things, the Asylkompromiss 
(“asylum compromise”) of 1993 introduced the notion of “safe third coun-
tries”: if a refugee entered Germany from such a country, he or she had no 
right to asylum and had to return to the other country. This was a kind of 
predecessor to the EU’s Dublin Regulation. As all neighbouring countries were 
regarded as safe, no refugee coming on a land route to Germany could claim 
asylum in the country. 
For many years, the German government did not centrally publish numbers 
of deportations. Figures had to be gathered from different sources, most im-
portantly from the government’s responses to enquiries by Members of Parlia-
ment (Schuster 2005: 610). According to ﬁgures going back to 1990 which 
were published in 2015 by the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 
(BAMF, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees), the number of deporta-
tions peaked in 1993 (47,070) and 1994 (53,043) but gradually decreased to 
less than 10,000 per year until 2012 (BAMF 2015: 141). There is a certain 
parallel between the numbers of deportations and the numbers of new appli-
cations for asylum (which, mainly due to the disintegration of Yugoslavia also 
peaked in 1992 with nearly 440,000 applicants). Yet the curve of deportations 
lagged behind the curve of arrivals and new applications and never reached 
5 For an analysis of the dynamics of right-extreme mobilisation against refugees see Rucht 2018.
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the same heights. Beginning in 2015 the deportation curve surged again (Sta-
tista 2019). The great majority of deportations since 2015 have involved per-
sons from the Balkan states (Deutscher Bundestag 2016a), while ﬁgures of 
deportations to non-European countries remain low. 
Legally and administratively, deportation is a complicated matter in Germa-
ny. For various reasons, most persons whose application for asylum is rejected 
are not deported and many of them get a Duldung (literally a “toleration”), a 
short-term permit that needs to be renewed frequently. Legally, a Duldung is 
just a temporary suspension of deportation. Persons get a Duldung if their 
deportation is impossible, for instance because their identity is unclear, they 
lack the papers to enter their country of nationality or that country is not will-
ing to allow their entry, but also for humanitarian reasons including the state 
of health. Persons also cannot be deported to countries where they are expect-
ed to suffer any serious harm. Only deportations to those countries that have 
been legally categorised as “safe states of origin”, i.e. where it is assumed that 
there is neither personal political persecution nor degrading or inhuman treat-
ment or punishment, are relatively straightforward.
Already before the “summer of migration” of 2015 with its all-time peak 
of new entries and 476,649 new applications for asylum (BAMF 2016: 10), 
numbers had risen considerably. In 2014 some 202,834 applications were 
submitted, almost one third of them by persons from the West Balkan states 
with hardly any prospect of being granted asylum. The number of persons 
with a Duldung grew, because only a few of those who did not get asylum left 
the country. In order to reduce the number of persons under Duldung and to 
increase the number of deportations, the Federal Government drafted a law in 
early summer 2015 on “the right to stay and the termination of residence”. By 
emphasising the difference between deserving and undeserving refugees, this 
law set the tone for the subsequent politics of asylum and deportation. The 
then Federal Minister of the Interior, Thomas de Maizière, justiﬁed the law 
with the following words: “This law has two clear messages: the right to stay 
for well-integrated and law-abiding foreigners, on the one hand, and the ter-
mination of residence of those who are not in need of protection, on the other. 
Both messages belong together” (Schwarze 2015, translation MS). 
Later that year, another reaction to the great inﬂux of refugees from, main-
ly, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan in 2015 was the passing of Asylum Package I, 
which categorised Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro as safe countries. In or-
der to reduce the number of refugees in Germany, the federal government 
continues to seek to extend the list of “safe countries of origin” and to speed 
up asylum processes, including possible deportation. Asylum Package I also 
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prohibits informing deportees of their imminent deportation6 and introduces 
the Abschiebegewahrsam: the taking of persons into custody for up to four 
days in order to ensure their deportation (Deutscher Bundestag 2016b: 8). In 
extreme cases, detention can be extended up to 18 months. 
Yet while the federal government sets the guidelines for the politics of de-
portation and initiates laws, and a federal agency, the Bundesamt für Migra-
tion und Flüchtlinge (Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees, BAMF), 
decides upon asylum applications and issues “deportation orders” (Abschie-
beandrohungen), the actual implementation of deportations lies in the hands 
of the federal states, which have a certain legal leeway to follow their own 
policies. According to Section 60a of the Residence Act, a government of a 
federal state may suspend deportations of certain national groups for up to 
three months (Dejure 2019a). If the government wants to suspend deporta-
tions beyond this time frame, it may issue resident permits, according to Sec-
tion 23.1 of the Residence Act (Dejure 2019b). Thus, not all federal states al-
ways comply with the guidelines of the federal government – there is instead a 
great variety of state policies, ranging from lenient Schleswig-Holstein to 
hard-line Bavaria. 
For more than a decade now, the German politics of migration has been gov-
erned by an integration paradigm: immigrants and foreigners in general are 
called to “integrate themselves” by learning German, adapting to local ways 
of life, etc. This has been a major paradigmatic shift, because the “guest work-
ers” that came to Germany from the 1960s onward were explicitly expected 
not to integrate but to return as soon as possible to their countries of origin. 
Beyond the surface, however, the integration paradigm is not integrative but 
exclusionary, as the call for integration generally emphasises migrants’ short-
comings and deﬁciencies. Thus the call for integration implies they are (not 
yet) sufficiently integrated (Sökefeld 2007).7 Since 2015, the integration para-
digm has been increasingly applied to newly arriving refugees. A few years ago 
Heide Castañeda (2010: 258) observed a shift in the conceptualisation of ide-
as of deservingness in the German asylum system, “moving away from a re-
sponse to political oppression and increasingly toward policies of compassion 
in the face of suffering. Today, deservingness is deﬁned chieﬂy by humanitari-
an considerations (such as illness or pregnancy), and the state is compelled by 
notions of compassion and justice.” Meanwhile, deservingness in terms 
of “integration” comes on top of this, as expressed by interior minister 
De Maizière in the quotation cited above. 
6 In the past, deportees were served deportation notices in advance, which enabled activists to organise 
solidarity campaigns in order to prevent deportation (Hinger et al. 2018). Furthermore, many rejected asy-
lum-seekers went underground after receiving such notices.
7 For a general critique of the integration paradigm see Schinkel 2018.
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Those deemed deserving receive support such as “integration courses” and 
language training. Deservingness is measured here in terms of the Bleibepers-
pektive, i.e. the probability that a person will be granted protection and stay 
in Germany. The Bleibeperspektive, a concept introduced by Asylum Package I, 
depends on the percentage of asylum seekers from a particular country that 
are granted protection. If this “protection quota” (Schutzquote), which in-
cludes not only asylum but also subsidiary protection, lies above the threshold 
of 50 per cent, people have a gute Bleibeperspektive (“good prospects to 
stay”) and are eligible for language training and other measures of support. 
While Syrians have good prospects, persons from safe countries of origin do 
not.8 The political goal is to prevent them from “integrating” and to return 
them as soon as possible to their country of origin. 
Deporting Afghans
In this context, the deportation of refugees from Afghanistan is particularly 
contentious. Although Afghans come from a country that for almost four dec-
ades has been torn by internal conﬂict and war, Afghans are not generally 
granted protection today, in contrast, for instance, to refugees coming from 
Syria. German asylum politics towards refugees from Afghanistan have be-
come increasingly restrictive. Migration from Afghanistan to Germany started 
in the 1950s with students and businesspeople, especially carpet merchants 
(Stroux 2002). With the beginning of the Soviet occupation in 1979 refugees 
started to come, mostly members of the Western educated elite. Subsequently, 
other groups began to arrive; after the Taliban came to power these were es-
pecially members of the urban middle class, but also rural ethnic and religious 
minorities.9 In Europe, Germany was the most important country of destina-
tion for Afghan refugees and by 2004, around 40 per cent of persons of Af-
ghan origin in Germany had acquired German citizenship (Baraulina et al. 
2007: 8f, Haque 2012). 
With the increasing violence in Afghanistan and the opening of the Balkan 
route in 2015 many more Afghans came to Germany, now mostly single young 
men and unaccompanied minors. The number of applications from Afghans 
surged dramatically and reached 127,012 in 2016 (BAMF 2017: 24).10 Alto-
8 Like the safe countries of origin, the Bleibeperspektive implicates a certain breach in the German logic 
of asylum: while the right to asylum is strictly conceptualised in terms of individual persecution, which 
needs to be ascertained individually, the Bleibeperspektive depends on a collective frame, irrespective of 
any individual circumstances.
9 On the emigration and transnational networks of Shia Hazaras from Afghanistan see Monsutti 2012.
10 The ﬁgure for 2014 was 9,115, for 2015 it was 31,328. The huge number of applications in 2016 large-
ly results from persons who entered Germany in 2015 but ﬁled their application the following year. In 2017 
the ﬁgure dropped to 16,423 (BAMF 2018: 21).
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gether, around 250,000 Afghans were living in Germany by 2017 and the 
Government tried to reduce this ﬁgure. While in 2015 some 78 per cent of 
Afghan applicants were accorded protection (either asylum or subsidiary pro-
tection) by the BAMF, this rate dropped to 61 per cent in 2016 and 47 per cent 
in 2017 (Pro Asyl 2019a). This is clearly not the result of an improvement of 
Afghanistan’s security situation, but of increasingly restrictive asylum poli-
tics.11 According to the refugee advocacy organisation Pro Asyl, the Afghans 
fell prey to the German government’s “deterrence strategy” intended to pre-
vent further immigration from Afghanistan (Pro Asyl 2018). At a meeting in 
Brussels in November 2015, the German Federal Minister of Interior said: “At 
the moment, our concern is the great number of refugees from Afghanistan. 
We want to send the signal to Afghanistan: ‘Stay there! We will return you 
directly from Europe to Afghanistan!’” (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2015, 
translation MS). The Afghans’ protection quota therefore fell below the 
threshold of 50 per cent, leaving them formally without a good Bleibeperspek-
tive. This, however, does not take into account the fact that more than 60 per 
cent of the negative BAMF decisions in Afghan asylum cases that were judi-
cially challenged were corrected by the courts (Pro Asyl 2018; Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 2018b) – the official Bleibeperspektive counts only the BAMF’s origi-
nal decisions. 
In December 2002 – that is, one year after NATO troops had started their 
ISAF engagement in Afghanistan – the conference of the interior ministers of 
both the federal government and the federal states decided that deportations 
to Afghanistan would be suspended because of the security situation in the 
country. Only criminal offenders were exempt from this general suspension of 
deportation. Many of the Afghans were also accorded an individual Abschie-
beverbot (“prohibition of deportation”), which often had to be secured in 
court. Only sporadic deportations of criminal offenders took place: from 2013 
to 2015, for instance, less than ten Afghans were deported per year. In 2016, 
around 3,300 Afghans returned “voluntarily”. Given the pressure and elector-
al success of right-wing mobilisation against refugees in Germany, the federal 
and several state governments were eager to reduce the number of Afghans by 
increasing deportations and remigration. The government of Bavaria stood at 
the forefront, together with the federal government. Arguing that parts of the 
Afghanistan were safe enough for deportees – also because of the efforts of 
German troops to enhance security12  – the federal government signed in Oc-
tober 2016 a “Joint Declaration of Intent on Cooperation in the Field of Mi-
gration” with the government of Afghanistan. This declaration was an agree-
11 According to the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Afghans “faced the largest variation in 
recognition rates in Europe, with the rate varying from 6% to 98%, depending on the country, with no 
apparent reason for the divergence lying in the nature of the cases” (ECRE 2019: 1).
12 This was an argument of the Bavarian Minister of Interior Joachim Herrmann; see Spiegel 2016a.
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ment for the readmission of rejected asylum-seekers. It referred to the German 
contributions to “Afghanistan’s development and civilian reconstruction ef-
fort including the establishment of a high-quality education system, and water 
and energy supply” and emphasised Germany’s “signiﬁcant support for Af-
ghanistan to build up its military and police force.” The declaration reiterated 
the commitment to the protection of asylum seekers and to refugee rights, 
stipulating that humanitarian conditions and individual threats to possible 
returnees would be taken into account, and it also speciﬁed that voluntary 
return should be preferred to deportations. In addition, the practicalities of 
the re-entry of Afghans were speciﬁed, including the documents required and 
the personnel involved.13 According to the journal Der Spiegel, the German 
government had threatened to suspend its development aid of several hundred 
million euros per year if the Afghan government did not sign the agreement 
(Spiegel 2016b). Similarly, the EU threatened to make its aid to Afghanistan 
“migration sensitive” by “linking it to the [Afghan] Government’s policy on 
migration and return and possibly to the implementation of the ‘Joint Way 
Forward’”, as was revealed through a leaked EU ”Non-Paper” on EU-Afghan 
cooperation (European Commission 2016; see also The Guardian 2016). 
Two months later, on 14 December 2016, the ﬁrst Sammelabschiebung 
(“collective deportation”) took place: 34 Afghans were put on a special ﬂight 
from Frankfurt to Kabul. Originally, the deportation of 50 persons had been 
planned, but the deportation of some was prevented by emergency appeals to 
the courts (Spiegel 2016a). At the time of writing in late March 2019, 22 col-
lective deportations have taken place, which altogether have returned 533 
men to Afghanistan (Tagesspiegel 2019, Bayerischer Flüchtlingsrat 2019a). 
The fate of potential deportees largely depends on the federal state in which 
they are registered. The largest number of deportees comes from Bavaria. The 
hitherto most notorious deportation took off on 3 July 2018 off from Munich 
Airport. There were 69 Afghans on the aircraft, 51 of them from Bavaria 
(Spiegel 2018a). This particular deportation gained particular notoriety be-
cause it took place on the birthday of federal minister of interior Horst See-
hofer, who at a press conference the next day joked about 69 Afghans being 
deported on his 69th birthday (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2018c). A few days later, 
one of the deportees committed suicide in Kabul (Spiegel 2018b). This was 
also the ﬁrst deportation after the ministry of foreign affairs had issued a con-
ﬁdential new assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan. Following 
the devastating bombing of the German Embassy in Kabul on 31 May 2017, 
which killed at least 150 people and wounded more than 300 (Spiegel 2017a, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 2017a), the critical debate about deportations to Af-
ghanistan had gained momentum. A Sammelabschiebung that was scheduled 
13 The text of the agreement has been made available online by Pro Asyl (2019b).
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for take-off on the day of the bomb attack was called off – officially, however, 
not because of the increasing insecurity in Afghanistan but only because the 
German embassy was not operative (Tagesspiegel 2017). The federal govern-
ment refused to issue a general ban on deportations but limited potential de-
portees to persons with a criminal record, potential terrorists and persons 
who ostensibly refused to clarify their identity (Spiegel 2017b).14 Deportations 
of such persons continued. These restrictions were lifted after a new assess-
ment in summer 2017. On 6 June that year, Chancellor Angela Merkel de-
clared in Parliament that Afghanistan was safe enough for deportees (Spiegel 
2018c), in spite of the fact that the country and especially its capital continued 
to be hit by deadly bomb attacks. 
The WHO sees Afghanistan as “one of the most dangerous and crisis-rid-
den countries in the world” (WHO 2017). The Global Peace Index 2018 ranks 
Afghanistan at 162 out of 163 countries (Vision of Humanity 2018). Accord-
ing to UNAMA, the UN mission in Afghanistan, the situation in the country 
continues to worsen: in 2018, the number of civilian casualties reached an 
unprecedented height (UNAMA 2019). In summer 2018, the UNHCR pub-
lished new guidelines for the protection of asylum-seekers from Afghanistan. 
The UN agency concluded that “given the current security, human rights and 
humanitarian situation in Kabul, an IFA/IRA [Internal ﬂight or relocation al-
ternative] is generally not available in the city” (UNHCR 2018: 114), contra-
dicting the statements of the German government and decisions by German 
courts that the Afghan capital was safe enough for deportees.15 In her very 
elaborate expert report on the security situation in Afghanistan, Friederike 
Stahlmann points out that deportees are particularly vulnerable because they 
mostly lack the dense family networks that are a prerequisite for both securing 
a livelihood and general protection in the country (Stahlmann 2018: 152, see 
also Stahlmann 2017). IOM reports that many returnees have lost contact 
with their families and those who have not lost contact are not necessarily 
accepted by their families when they return (IOM 2014: 24). According to 
research among returned migrants from Norway and from the UK, most re-
turnees live under constant fear, even if they are not personally threatened, 
and many do not dare to go out (Oeppen / Majidi 2015: 3). A long-term study 
by Schuster and Majidi (2013), drawing on a sample of 100 returnees in Af-
ghanistan, shows that under these conditions returnees and deportees feel 
forced to leave the country again as soon as possible. Because of this situation, 
in contrast to Bavaria and Saxony, most of those federal states whose govern-
14 The clariﬁcation of identity is particularly difficult for Afghans because there is no standard way of 
transcribing their names from Pashtu or Dari to German or English. Therefore names frequently differ on 
transcriptions and translations of Afghan identity documents. German authorities often blame the refugees 
for this.
15 The assessment that Afghanistan is “safe enough” rests on speciﬁc juridical constructions of danger. See 
Tiedemann 2016.
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ments were headed by the SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany) continued 
to limit deportations to persons with a criminal record, etc. (Spiegel 2018d).
Bavaria in particular, however, vowed to further increase the pace of depor-
tations without any restrictions. According to a press release published by the 
Bavarian Ministry of the Interior, only 5 of the 51 Bavarian Afghans on the 
deportation ﬂight of 3 July 2018 had a criminal record. Bavarian Interior 
Minister Joachim Herrmann emphasised that 21 of the deportees had been 
deported out of custody, thus applauding the detention policy. He further re-
ported that Bavaria would continue to resort to all instruments of deportation 
because a strong rule of law was needed to enforce the repatriation of unsuc-
cessful asylum applicants: “If in due process the authorities and courts arrive 
at the conclusion that a person does not have the right to stay in Germany, 
then his departure has to follow. Only in this way, with a strong rule of law 
which is determined to enforce the obligation to leave the country, will we 
safeguard the required acceptance for our system of asylum and the accept-
ance of those who have been accorded the right to stay and who shall be inte-
grated well” (Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Inneren 2018, translation 
MS).16 On the same occasion, the minister emphasised that deportations to 
Afghanistan could be carried out without any restriction. 
The minister’s statement is a clear example of the twofold strategy to legiti-
mise deportations. First, deserving and undeserving refugees have to be distin-
guished, assuming that a clear distinction between the two categories is possi-
ble, and second, those who are undeserving and therefore have no right to stay 
in Germany have to leave the country – if necessary, by being deported. Ac-
cording to this reasoning, the unrelenting enforcement of repatriation, depor-
tations included, is the basis for the acceptance of the asylum laws in Germa-
ny. In order to mark undeserving asylum seekers, a new vocabulary has been 
coined that in a way replaced the earlier “bogus asylum seekers” and “eco-
nomic refugees”. Now the Straftäter (“criminals”), Gefährder (“potential ter-
rorists”) and the hartnäckige Identitätsverweigerer (persons who refuse to 
clarify their identity by withholding documents, or who are unsuccessful in 
procuring documents) exemplify those who do not deserve protection, who 
pose a danger to German society and who therefore have to be deported even 
if they may suffer serious harm in the country of deportation. According to the 
current logic of integration, they have refused to integrate by violating the 
rules of Zusammenleben (“living together”) in Germany. They may be deport-
ed to Afghanistan even when the situation in the country is obviously unsafe. 
The question of whether even a criminal has the right to protection from harm 
16 “Wenn Behörden und Gerichte in einem rechtsstaatlichen Verfahren zu dem Ergebnis kommen, dass 
jemand kein Bleiberecht in Deutschland hat, dann muss seine Ausreise folgen. Nur so, mit einem starken 
Rechtsstaat, der die Pﬂicht zur Ausreise unbeirrt umsetzt, erhalten wir die notwendige Akzeptanz für unser 
Asylsystem und für jene, die hier ein Bleiberecht haben und gut integriert werden sollen.”
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is never asked. In this argument, safety and security are not fundamental hu-
man rights but must be earned and deserved. 
According to the president of the Catholic welfare organisation Caritas, 
Peter Neher, the resumption of collective deportations to Afghanistan had 
more to do with the atmosphere in Germany and with domestic politics than 
with the security situation in Afghanistan (Berliner Zeitung 2017). By increas-
ing the pacing of deportations, the government intended to placate and win 
back those sections of the German electorate that after 2015 turned towards 
the extreme right and enabled the electoral success of the right-wing party 
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). This is particularly true for Bavaria. For 
decades, Bavaria has been ruled by the conservative CSU and this party in 
particular feared competition on the right. It attempted to avert the movement 
of conservative voters to the AfD by executing a determined hard-line policy 
towards asylum and deportation. 
The CSU government’s emphasis that rejected asylum-seekers who are con-
sidered non-integrated and undeserving have to leave Germany does not imply 
that those who are integrated are allowed to stay. On the contrary, even per-
sons who by the criteria of the integration paradigm are “well integrated” (i.e. 
they have a job, go to school or take part in a professional training and have 
no criminal record) are often selected for deportation. In several cases, for 
instance, young Afghans have been arrested for deportation in their schools. 
One may even conclude that these “well integrated” Afghans are especially 
easy prey for the Bavarian deportation regime because they lead a regular, 
predictable life. Thus, it is much easier to apprehend them and put them on a 
plane than a “non-integrated” person who has no regular occupation and can 
easily abscond. 
Antje Ellermann (2005, 2009) has argued convincingly that because depor-
tations are controversial and have the potential to arouse affects and actions 
of solidarity, governments have increasingly taken efforts to deport people 
almost invisibly in order to prevent the resistance and suffering of deportees 
from becoming public. Decisions about deportation are taken by the adminis-
tration, removed from local politicians who might be held responsible by their 
electorate. And while earlier deportations were carried out on scheduled 
ﬂights, often creating public scandal, now special chartered aircraft are invari-
ably used. In Germany in 1999, the campaign “deportation.class” scandalised 
the public after Aamir Ageeb, a rejected asylum-seeker from Sudan, died of 
suffocation because of police action on a regular Lufthansa ﬂight.17 Similarly, 
deportees are mostly apprehended at night or in the early hours, also in order 
to prevent public visibility. Yet the great wave of volunteer support for refu-
gees that arose in the summer of 2015 also created a new visibility for depor-
17 See the (not updated) website http://www.noborder.org/archive/www.deportation-class.com/lh/index.
html (accessed 31 March 2019).
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tations, as now many more people in Germany have close relations with refu-
gees than ever before. 
The CSU and other like-minded politicians did not take into account that 
the tightening of asylum and deportation policies has perhaps had less of an 
effect placating voters leaning towards the extreme right than estranging those 
on the other side of the political spectrum. This at least can be concluded from 
the results of the Bavarian elections of October 2018, in which the CSU lost 
more than ten per cent of votes (resulting in the party’s loss of absolute major-
ity in the Bavarian parliament) while the refugee-friendly “Green Party” (Die 
Grünen) gained almost 9 per cent (Spiegel 2018e). The Green Party in fact 
won around 170,000 votes from erstwhile CSU-voters (Welt 2018), a develop-
ment that a few years earlier would have been unimaginable. Commentators 
concluded that the CSU had lost many of its liberal and Christian supporters 
due to its uncompromising politics of asylum (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2018d). 
After the so-called “refugee crisis”, many German politicians feared the right-
wing groups that capitalised on anti-refugee sentiments, but they failed to see 
that on the other hand a huge number of people in Germany continued their 
voluntary commitments in support of refugees and even asylum-seekers who 
had been rejected. Such support includes not only commitments such as vol-
untary language teaching or assisting refugees in their interaction with the 
authorities, but also efforts to avert deportations. Also in Bavaria, volunteers 
try to save rejected asylum-seekers from being deported not only through legal 
means but also by staging protests and issuing appeals to authorities and poli-
ticians. 
Resisting deportation
On 31 May 2017, police entered a vocational college in Nuremberg in order 
to arrest Asef N., a 20-year-old Afghan, for deportation. While the young Af-
ghan at ﬁrst did not resist and entered the police car to be taken away, a group 
of his fellow students who realised what was going on sat down in front of the 
car in order to prevent its departure. More and more students joined and over 
the following hours, more than 300 students were protesting. Violent clashes 
with the police followed; the police used pepper spray and their batons and 
detained some of the protestors. After several hours, Asef N. was taken away 
while the protests continued. Protestors marched to the Nuremberg foreigner 
registration office. Civil society organisations and the political opposition ve-
hemently criticised the police for detaining a person out of a classroom. A 
trade union condemned the “inhuman” approach of the Bavarian government 
(Süddeutsche Zeitung 2017b, Spiegel 2017c). Authorities had planned to put 
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Asef N. on the deportation ﬂight that was later called off due to the bomb at-
tack in Kabul. The foreigner registration office wanted to detain him pending 
later deportation but he was released by a court decision on the following day 
(Süddeutsche Zeitung 2017c).
This was probably the most spectacular case of protest against the deporta-
tion of an Afghan in Bavaria but it was by no means the only effort to prevent 
deportation. Refugee support organisations such as the Bayerischer Flücht-
lingsrat (“Bavarian Refugee Council”, BFR), the Münchner Flüchtlingsrat 
(“Munich Refugee Council”, MFR) or the Karawane München (“Munich 
Caravan”) circulate dates of deportation ﬂights and sometimes organise pro-
test demonstrations. On 11 September 2018, for instance, several hundred 
people protested in Munich at the time when a deportation ﬂight was sched-
uled for take-off to Kabul from Munich Airport. Such organisations also pub-
lish legal alerts and information for potential deportees and their supporters 
to prevent deportation.18
Over the recent years, a dense network of volunteers engaged in the sup-
port of refugees has grown across Bavaria. They are mostly based in local 
support organisations, many of them linked to parishes. To exchange infor-
mation and advice many of them communicate via an email list established in 
2015 that includes around one thousand addresses. Many of these emails refer 
to issues relating to Afghans, like the problem of getting a tazkira, an Afghan 
identity document that is required for many purposes and that is difficult to 
procure, or of gaining access to the services of the Afghan consulate general in 
Munich. Also information about imminent deportations, news about Afghans 
who have been taken into custody for deportation, calls for appeals to the 
government and politicians and comments on deportation politics are ex-
changed over the list. 
On 27 September 2018, for instance, the news was circulated that another 
Sammelabschiebung was scheduled for 2 October 2018. Later that day it be-
came known that a young Afghan called A. had been arrested for deportation 
from his school in Passau. Possible protest letters to members of the Bavarian 
government were disseminated over the email list that in particular pointed 
out that this arrest contradicted the government’s announcements that consid-
erations of proportionality would always be taken into account in decisions of 
deportation. Many volunteers sent such appeals and made this known on the 
list. One volunteer reported that a week earlier a CSU member of the Bavarian 
parliament had refused to support a petition against the arrest of Afghans 
from schools, arguing that such a thing would never happen anyway. I joined 
18 See, for instance Bayerischer Flüchtlingsrat 2019b. While despite the draft of the new deportation law 
publishing deportation dates is not yet a criminal offence, the government tries to prevent such alerts. In 
2018, the Bavarian government threatened to stop public funding of all organisations involved in such 
counselling. Not only political organisations such as the BFR were threatened in this way but also church-
based organisations such as Caritas or Diakonie (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2017d, Münchner Merkur 2017).
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the appeals. The next day I got a message from the government that A. had 
been released from custody. It was explained that A.’s efforts towards educa-
tion and integration had not been known to the regional government of Low-
er Bavaria, which was responsible for his detention. The next day it was re-
ported that another Afghan, Mujtaba A., had been detained earlier at the 
foreigner registration office, where he had gone for the renewal of his Dul-
dung. According to the information circulated, he had ﬁnished school and had 
an offer for a workplace and further training. He too was released after ap-
peals had been sent. It’s probably no accident that in these cases, which had 
become known two weeks before the elections, the government took swift 
action and released the arrested Afghans. 
On 4 October 2018, the BFR published an appeal titled “Human Dignity 
instead of Deportation Hysteria” directed at the electorate in Bavaria. The 
appeal was supported by 3,000 initiatives and advocacy organisations across 
Bavaria as well as individual supporters. It called for not voting for anti-refu-
gee parties in the upcoming elections and asked voters to consider also the 
interests of those who, like refugees, have no right to vote (Bayerischer Flücht-
lingsrat 2018a). 
A month later, another case was intensely discussed among volunteers and 
activists: on 8 November 2018, an Afghan threatened to jump out of the win-
dow when police attempted to arrest him for deportation in an accommoda-
tion centre in Bayreuth. After two hours, a lawyer intervened and took him to 
hospital. He was scheduled for the 18th Sammelabschiebung to Afghanistan 
that took place on 13 November 2018. After the elections, the CSU ministers 
in government were much less ready to reconsider deportations. The plane 
took off on 13 November 2018 and according to a press release of the BFR it 
contained persons with mental illness, students and persons who had been of-
fered training positions but been refused permission by the authorities to take 
them up (Bayerischer Flüchtlingsrat 2018b).19
In addition to such actions for the support of individual Afghans threat-
ened by deportation, there are also actions aiming at disseminating the mes-
sage that Afghanistan is unsafe for anyone. In April 2018, the BFR and Mu-
nich Caravan started a “banner action” for this purpose. Initiatives were 
called to print banners reading “Not Safe – We Demand No Deportations to 
Afghanistan” and to display them in public spaces. Photographs of these ac-
tions were published on a website (Afghanistan Not Safe 2019). This cam-
paign gained particular momentum in summer 2018. Altogether 44 such ban-
ners were displayed by diverse initiatives and organisations at different places 
in Munich and many more in other cities. In July 2018, the campaign organ-
ised a conference on deportations to Afghanistan that took place in the Belle-
19 For the example of an Afghan trainee on this ﬂight see also Süddeutsche Zeitung 2018e.
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vue di Monaco, another cultural centre that supports refugees in Munich (Af-
ghanistan Not Safe 2018). 
In recent years, a multifaceted scene of initiatives and activists opposing 
deportations to Afghanistan has developed in Bavaria. According to studies 
on voluntary commitments, such engagement for refugees has multiplied and 
diversiﬁed since 2015. Ulrike Haman and Serhat Karakayali (2016) point out 
that the “summer of migration” dramatically changed the composition of vol-
unteers: on average, volunteers have become older and increasing numbers of 
people in rural areas and towns have engaged with refugees, while before such 
commitments had been concentrated in bigger cities. The authors interpret 
this as a normalisation of the movement of engaging with refugees. While be-
fore 2015 the slogan “Refugees Welcome” and campaigns against deportation 
were largely limited to leftist activists and some more or less spontaneous 
political initiatives organised by refugees themselves (Danielzik / Bendix 2017) 
it has now become part of a mainstream “welcome culture”. Most of the new 
volunteers who started to engage with refugees in 2015 had in fact more a 
humanitarian than an explicitly political agenda. Their aim was to assist the 
local “integration” of the newly arrived migrants in their villages, towns and 
neighbourhoods, also in order to prevent friction and local conﬂicts. Their 
commitments did not challenge the political framework of the German asylum 
and immigration system, unlike, for instance, the activists of anti-racism net-
works such as Kein Mensch ist illegal (“No Human Being is Illegal”) or No 
Border, who demand the abolition of border controls and consider the free-
dom of movement a universal human right. Such far-reaching political de-
mands were much beyond the aims of the “new” volunteers. Also, the restric-
tions of the Asylum Packages I and II did not provoke much protest among 
them. According to Stephan Dünnwald of the BFR,20 a section of the volun-
teers was, however, politicised in particular by the resumed collective deporta-
tions to Afghanistan: they had to watch the young Afghans, for whose “inte-
gration” – especially in terms of language learning and professional training 
– they had invested much time and effort, being arrested and returned to Af-
ghanistan. And while the Bavarian government, too, tried to carry out depor-
tations stealthily, invisibility was subordinated to “efficiency”, if deemed nec-
essary. Thus, Afghans are sometimes apprehended for deportation from schools 
and classrooms although this creates particular scandal. Further, while the 
deportations themselves are mostly carried out covertly, their results have to 
be announced publicly in press conferences with the intention of placating 
right-wing voters. 
The obvious contradiction between the government’s integration rhetoric 
and the actual practice of deportation triggered protest and action in support 
20 Personal interview on 15 March 2019.
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of deportees. These protests, too, do not imply any fundamental challenge to 
the German asylum system, as they take the distinction of deserving and 
non-deserving refugees for granted. But they signal a serious estrangement 
from a government that has been perceived as not honouring its own princi-
ples – or rather as using such principles as a smokescreen to hide a dirty prac-
tice of almost indiscriminate deportation. By protesting and appealing on be-
half of Afghans who are arrested from their schools or who are taken out of 
their professional training and jobs, volunteers affirm the paradigm of deserv-
ingness and its concomitant logic of integration. This logic is ratiﬁed by the 
volunteers’ emphasis that a particular Afghan who is threatened by deporta-
tion is, in fact, “well integrated” and therefore deserves to stay. 
Strategically, the emphasis of an Afghan’s deservingness and “integration” 
is the only promising approach to avert his deportation by political means. 
Nobody is willing to demand the right to stay of a person who is considered a 
criminal or potential terrorist. Not only volunteers but also employers assert 
the usefulness of their Afghan employees if the latter are threatened by depor-
tation. The Bavarian Chamber of Industry and Commerce sometimes supports 
such Afghan employees (or rather their employers), but this happens through 
political backchannels and is not made public. Lobbying organisations such as 
the BFR use similar channels with individual politicians to save Afghans from 
being deported. After the Bavarian elections the CSU, having lost its majority 
in Parliament, had to form a coalition government with the regional party 
Freie Wähler (“Free Voters”). In their election manifesto the Freie Wähler had 
vowed to review the strict deportation programme of the Bavarian govern-
ment. Being held to their word, they are now regularly approached in the case 
of “integrated” deportees. “If by such means we get one or two Afghans off 
each deportation ﬂight, we have to consider this as a success,” said Stephan 
Dünnwald. 
Conclusion
Considering the actual number of deportations to Afghanistan – little more 
than 500 at the time of writing in spring 2019 since the resumption of Sam-
melabschiebungen in December 2016 – and comparing it with the number of 
Afghans living in Germany (around 250,000), the issue of deportations seems 
relatively insigniﬁcant. Yet it is not. It is the site where symbolic and actual 
battles over sovereignty, belonging and rights are fought. The power to deter-
mine who is allowed to live in a state’s territory is seen as a signiﬁcant aspect 
of sovereignty. In Germany, the openness of borders that allowed the inﬂux of 
large numbers of refugees in 2015 was seen by some as a loss of sovereignty 
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and a threat to the rule of law. Today, sovereignty and the rule of law have to 
be restored by deporting people who have no right to stay, the federal govern-
ment and the government of Bavaria insist time and again. Even if the actual 
number of deportations is limited, the effort signals to a refugee-critical audi-
ence that the government is taking the issue seriously – not only by deporting 
rejected asylum-seekers but also by creating laws and regulations that are in-
tended to enable more deportations, even at the cost of criminalising volun-
teers and undermining means of legal redress. Yet, bound by manifold obliga-
tions and often contradictory considerations in a highly complex migration 
regime (Nieswand 2018), the government is by no means a uniﬁed sovereign 
actor. Sovereignty is in part challenged by the logic of integration. Originally 
a demand directed at labour migrants and their offspring that drew the mi-
grants’ belonging into question by insisting that they were not (yet) sufficient-
ly integrated, the integration claim shifted to the refugee issue and is now 
turned on its head by volunteers who argue that a particular person is well 
integrated and therefore deserves the right to stay. The logic of integration 
indeed has become a central aspect of the German asylum regime. A few years 
ago, Heide Castañeda (2010) argued that in contrast to the United States, 
considerations of “social citizenship”, i.e. a person’s local social integration, 
did not resonate powerfully in debates about deportations in Germany. To-
day, as we have seen, this aspect stands at the centre of the politics of the right 
to stay and has perhaps surpassed humanitarian considerations related to 
health issues (Ticktin 2011) in this regard. “Integration” has certainly become 
the most important criterion of “deservingness”. The logic of integration has 
become so entrenched that lobbying organisations have to resort to what I call 
a “strategic integrationism” in order to ﬁght some deportations. They have to 
do so even if they are critical of the underlying notion of deservingness, and 
thus even at the risk of obscuring the universal human right to “Life, Liberty 
and Security” as enshrined in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which does not distinguish “deserving” from “non-deserving” human 
beings.
While the issue of deportation thus has highly symbolic signiﬁcance for 
political debates in Germany, it is an existential matter for the Afghan refu-
gees themselves. Even if only a few of them are actually deported, the threat of 
deportation looms large and creates an enduring existential situation of uncer-
tainty and insecurity. The deportation of a few reminds all of their vulnerabil-
ity. An (unintended?) consequence of this is that many Afghans leave Germa-
ny for a neighbouring country that is deemed safer. Recently, volunteers 
estimated that the majority of Afghans in their district had clandestinely left 
Bavaria for France. Thus, the relatively symbolic quantity of actual deporta-
tions has a multiplying effect. Leaving Germany “illegally”, however, is con-
sidered cause for deportation in the event of a return to Bavaria. At the time 
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of writing, two Afghans are in conﬁnement awaiting their deportation to Af-
ghanistan after having been deported from France to Germany through the 
Dublin Regulation. 
Yet the signiﬁcance of deporting Afghans from Germany reaches beyond 
the refugee issue and points to global power relations and inequalities. We 
may argue that these deportations have the purpose not only of reducing the 
number of Afghans in Germany, but also of justifying the military interven-
tion in Afghanistan. The government’s reiteration that Afghanistan is “safe 
enough” for deportees is often accompanied by references to the engagement 
of German military and police sent to the country to bring peace, security, 
human rights and development. The admission that Afghanistan is not safe at 
all would be a devastating evaluation of these engagements. At the receiving 
end of interventions and at the bottom of the global hierarchy of nations, Af-
ghanistan is not in a position to challenge international policies. Threatened 
by the reduction or even cancellation of international aid, the country cannot 
afford, for instance, to refuse the readmission of migrants, even if the condi-
tions for their “reintegration” are unfavourable and perhaps further add to 
the country’s difficulties. We should also recall that Afghanistan’s current dis-
astrous state of affairs is rooted in previous interventions, those by the Soviet 
army and by the CIA. 
The inequality of lives is underlined by the travel advice issued by the Ger-
man Foreign Office, which warns against visiting Afghanistan and describes 
the dangers in the country. Yet these warnings are not meant for deportees. 
The deportee has replaced the transmigrant as the epitomising ﬁgure of the 
global regime of mobility. In contrast with transmigrants, deportees are not 
autonomous but forced to move. Their fate is negotiated between the state 
that wants to deport them and the state that agrees to their readmission. In 
these negotiations, refugees and migrants have no voice and, as a consequence, 
no choice. Nations have been “re-bound”; people are put back in the place 
determined by their nationality. The deportee stands symbolically for the se-
lectivity of borders and the global system of inequality that reserves the right 
to a good and safe life to a few only – at the expense of many others. 
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